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NOTES
"voluntary association," from determining qualifications for its
members, and from thereby excluding unwanted persons on any
basis whatever where the primary election was conducted by the
party. In the Classic case, however, the right of all persons to
vote in primary elections was said to be protected by the Consti-
tution from abridgment by individual action where the primary
in practical operation governs the final selection of officers, even
though, apparently, it is not made by state law an "integral part"
of the state election machinery.14 It is certainly logical to con-
clude that a political party is no more free to deprive the negro
of this constitutional right than is the corrupt vote counter.
The decision in the Classic case should be welcomed as a step
forward toward insuring honest elections for congressional offices.
It will permit extension of such present election laws as the
Hatch Act,15 the failure of which to embrace primary elections
was due at least in part to fear that such a step would be held
unconstitutional.' 6 But it seems certain to provoke further litiga-
tion in the primary election field.
A.B.R.
IMPEACHMENT-JUDGES-MIsCONDUCT IN PERSONAL CAPACITY-
MISCONDUCT DURING PRIOR TERM-In a suit to determine whether
or not a district judge should be suspended from office pending
his impeachment proceedings for alleged malfeasance the defend-
ant excepts to evidence of misconduct in his personal capacity
and in a prior term. Held, a public official may be removed for
(1) misconduct in his personal as well as official capacity and (2)
misconduct in a prior term. Stanley v. Jones, 2 So. (2d) 45 (La.
1941).
Whether impeachment" proceedings are civil or criminal in
14. See 61 S.Ct. at 1039, 85 L.Ed. at 875.
15. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), 18 U.S.C.A. § 61 (Supp. 1940).
16. See United States v. Classic, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1041, n. 5, 85 L.Ed. 867, 877,
n. 5 (1941).
1. The word "impeachment" in its original sense-derived from the Latin
impedicare (pedica, fetter, and pes, pedem, foot)-meant "to hinder" or "to
prevent" but in parliamentary usage its meaning of an accusation or charge
was acquired. Later, possibly in the sixteenth century, this word began to
assume its present meaning, a proceeding to remove a public official upon
an accusation of a crime or of some official misconduct or neglect. Yankwich,
Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution (1937) 26 Geo.
L. J. 849; Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1931) 610.
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nature is a mooted question,2 but Louisiana jurisprudence treats
such proceedings as civil,3 probably on the theory that impeach-
ment is designed to provide a speedy and adequate method of
removing derelict and unscrupulous officers from positions in
which they might do further harm to those who placed them in
offices of trust. Influenced by this objective and by the considera-
tion that the punishment of the offender is at most secondary, the
Louisiana courts understandably take a view of the matter cal-
culated to eliminate the delay and ineffectiveness which too often
characterize criminal procedure.
Prior Louisiana cases had established that the misconduct
which would warrant the removal of a public official had to be
such as affected the performance of his duties as an officer and
not merely his character as a private individual.4 The Jones case,
however, adopts a stricter construction of the phrase "gross mis-
conduct" in Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution. The deci-
sion, without reference to the earlier cases, permits remo&al for
misconduct either in the officer's official or personal capacity.
However, the later rule is probably the more logical since the
language of the constitutional provision makes it clear that the
gross misconduct and drunkeness referred to as grounds for re-
moval relate to personal derelictions, since, unlike the other
grounds for removal, they are not expressly confined to conduct
in office.
A second issue presented was whether or not a public official
might be removed for misconduct in a prior term. Although the
decisions in other states conflict on this question, 6 Louisiana has
2. Criminal: Kilburn v. Law, 111 Cal. 237, 43 Pac. 615 (1896); Sharp v.
Brown, 38 Idaho 136, 221 Pac. 139 (1923); State ex rel. Houston v. District
Court, 61 Mont. 558, 202 Pac. 756 (1921). Civil: Gay v. District Court, 41 Nev.
330, 171 Pac. 156, 3 A.L.R. 224 (1918); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Medler, 17
N.M. 644, 131 Pac. 976, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1141 (1913); State v. Scarth, 151 Okla.
178, 3 P. (2d) 446 (1931); Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 Pac. 487 (1906). But
see Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596, 208 Pac. 711 (1922).
3. Saint v. Irion, 165 La. 1035, 116 So. 549 (1928); Stanley v. Jones, 2 So.
(2d) 45 (La. 1941).
4. State v. Kellam, 4 La. 494 (1832); State ex rel. Attorney-General v.
Cheevers, 32 La. Ann. 941 (1880); State ex rel. Moore v. Reid, 129 La. 158, 55
So. 748 (1911); Coco v. Jones, 154 La. 124, 97 So. 337 (1923); Saint v. Irion,
165 La. 1035, 116 So. 549 (1928).
5. "All State and district officers, whether elected or appointed, shall be
liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors in office, incom-
petency, corruption, favoritism, extortion, or oppression in office, or for gross
misconduct, or habitual drunkenness." La. Const. of 1921, Art. IX, § 1.
6. Refusing to allow removal for offenses during a prior term: State ex
rel. Attorney-General v. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559 (1913); Jacobs v. Par-
ham, 175 Ark. 86, 298 S.W. 483 (1927); Thurston v. Clark, 107 Cal. 285, 40 Pac.
435 (1895); Board of Commissioners of Kingfisher County v. Schectler, 139
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consistently held to the view which permits removal for miscon-
duct in a prior term.7 Some courts reason that by re-election the
public has condoned the fault of the official, whether such short-
comings were known or not;8 while, other tribunals reach the
dubious conclusion that permitting a public official to be removed
for his misconduct in a prior term is depriving the citizenry of
its sacred right of selecting its own officials;9 and still other courts
treat each term as a separate entity in itself, permitting removal
only for acts done within the current term. 0 The most serious
objection to the theory of condonation of past offenses lies in the
ever present possibility that re-election may not constitute con-
donation either because the facts were not known or because the
election was corrupt." The explanation given for the contrary
view, which permits removal for acts in a prior term, is based on
the idea that such a proceeding has as its fundamental purpose
the removal of a corrupt, incapable, or unworthy official, and
that the commission of any of the acts which are grounds for re-
moval the day before re-election just as effectively stamps him
as an improper person to be entrusted with the duties and re-
sponsibilities of a public office as those which occur the day after.
The rules adopted in the Jones case provide a definite check
against misconduct by public officials at all times since they
throw open to investigation personal as well as official miscon-
duct and refuse to recognize any distinction with respect to the
time when the misconduct took place. Whether the court would
carry the past misconduct inquiry even further remains to be
seen. In other jurisdictions removal for prior misconduct in an
entirely separate office has been denied,' 2 and there seem to be
Okla. 52, 281 Pac. 222 (1929); In re Fudula, 297 Pa. 364, 147 Atl. 67 (1929);
State ex rel. Rawlings v. Loomis, 29 S.W. 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). But see
In re Throop Borough School Directors, 298 Pa. 453, 148 Atl. 518 (1930).
Contra: Tibbs v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 18, 53 S.E. 811 (1906); State v.
Welsh, 109 Iowa 19, 79 N.W. 369 (1899); Attorney-General v. Tufts, 239 Mass.
458, 131 N.E. 573 (1921); Territory v. Sanches, 14 N.M. 493, 94 Pac. 954 (1908);
State ex rel. Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510 (1916). See Haw-
kins v. Common Council, 192 Mich. 276, 158 N.W. 953 (1916). Compare State ex
rel. Boynton v. Jackson, 139 Kan. 744, 33 P. (2d) 118, 119 (1934).
7. State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois, 45 La. Ann. 1350, 14 So. 28 (1893).
See also State ex rel. Perez v. Whitaker, 116 La. 947, 41 So. 218 (1906). See
State v. Lazarus, 39 La. Ann. 142, 163, 1 So. 361, 377 (1887).
8. State ex rel. Schulz v. Patton, 131 Mo. App. 628, 110 S.W. 636 (1908).
9. State v. Blake, 138 Okla. 241, 280 Pac. 833 (1929).
10. Jacobs v. Parham, 175 Ark. 86, 298 S.W. 483 (1927).
11. Such a hypothetical situation was fully developed in State ex rel.
Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 79, 80, 183 S.W. 510, 513 (1916).
12. Speed v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 98 Mich. 360, 57 N.W.
406 (1894).
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no cases which have permitted removal for misconduct during
an interregnum in office or for misconduct prior to having ever
been elected.
G.R.J.
LIBEL-CREDIT AGENCIES-QUALIFIED PRIVILEGES-The nation-
wide growth of credit agencies has raised many difficult legal
problems. Conspicuous among these are those arising in the field
of defamation. There has been much conflict in the courts as to
the privileges of defamation to be allowed such agencies in con-
ducting their business. The English courts, together with those
in a few American jurisdictions, have stated that the motive of
profit destroys all privilege and hold such agencies to absolute
liability for false communications.' The general American rule,
however, has been to recognize the economic need for such or-
ganizations, and to accord them a privilege on certain occasions. 2
The Louisiana courts have not recently had occasion to pass on
this problem. There is, however, an earlier case which may well
become a landmark in our jurisprudence and which, therefore,
merits consideration.
Defendant, a credit agency, made a general report to its sub-
scribers that a suit was pending against S. Giacona and Son. The
suit, in fact, was against S. Giacona and not against the plaintiff
S. Giacona and Son, as erroneously reported. Plaintiff sued for
damages showing that credit had been refused it because of de-
fendant's report. Held, defendant was liable for compensatory
damages for negligence in not checking the court record. Giacona
v. Bradstreet Company, 48 La. Ann. 1191, 20 So. 706 (1896).
The syllabus prepared by the court states the rule prevalent
in most jurisdictions that a publication of a credit agency issued
to subscribers generally is not a privileged communication.$ On
1. Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007
(1914); Macintosh v. Dun [1908] A.C. 390. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of
Torts (1933) 539, § 249; Prosser, Law of Torts (1941) 835.
2. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (4 ed. 1932) 558, § 159; Harper,
loc. cit. supra note 1; Prosser, loc. cit. supra note 1.
3. Erber and Stickler v. R. J. Dun and Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C.C. Ark. 1882);
Simons v. Petersberger, 181 Iowa 770, 165 N.W. 91 (1917); Pollasky v. Mincher,
81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Hanschke v. Merchants Credit Bureau, 256
Mich. 272, 239 N.W. 318 (1932); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W.
358 (1893); King v. Patterson, 49 N.J. Law 417, 9 Atl. 705, 60 Am. Rep. 622
(1887); Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N.Y. 188, 7 Am. Rep. 322 (1871); Brad-
street Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753, 2 L.R.A., 403 (1888).
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